Great Power Competition and the Effects of Global Fragmentation on International Law

By: Bryan H. Druzin

PDF: Great Power Competition

This Article examines the effects global fragmentation could have on international law. It argues that a policy of containment against China has the potential to divide the global system and lead to a weakening of international law. Containment could fragment the international system because it may push many States to align more closely with China to protect their core economic interests. At the same time, containment pressures will likely compel China to develop a parallel institutional architecture to reflect these new economic relations and to decrease its dependence on US-dominated institutions. This economic and institutional fragmentation, should it occur, will diminish the authority of international law because it will reduce the incentives for States to comply with their international obligations when doing so conflicts with their interests.

This Article presents a model that explains State compliance with international law in relation to the structure of the international system. The central claim is that compliance is influenced by the degree to which there is one dominant institutional order. In a consolidated system, States are more likely to obey international law because there is only one game in town for international cooperation and they fear being isolated from it. However, fragmentation reduces this compliance pressure because States can migrate to alternative networks of international cooperation, which lowers the costs of noncompliance. This Article uses Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a case study to support this claim, arguing that Russia’s behavior should be understood as an early warning sign that the global order is fragmenting and a breakdown in international law is already underway.